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AN UNUSUAL SEPARATION OF POWER EPISODE:
SAMANTAR V. YOUSUF AND THE NEED FOR THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH TO ASSERT CONTROL OVER FOREIGN OFFICIAL
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DETERMINATIONS
Lauren Manns*

INTRODUCTION
As more human rights cases are being initiated against current and former heads
of state in courts around the world, the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine has become
a hotly contested issue. Victims and the families of victims of human rights abuses are
beginning to question whether the immunity doctrine should apply to officials who
commit serious human rights offenses, and several states have followed suit.1 Foreign
sovereign immunity, which was originally meant to allow for current state officials to
have freedom to conduct foreign policy, has also traditionally protected former officials
from suit after they leave office. International norms are beginning to shift, however,
and some states are allowing suits to move forward against former officials in order to
provide torture victims and their families vindication. The doctrine in the United States
is in flux, leaving international lawyers questioning the sincerity of United States participation in human rights enforcement efforts. As a result, torture victims are left uncertain about whether their individual claims will have any chance in the United States
court system.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Samantar v. Yousuf 2 addressed the doctrine of foreign official sovereign immunity and resolved a circuit split regarding the
federal statutory scheme of the doctrine in the United States. The decision, however, did
not answer many of the questions regarding the doctrine’s status or applicability in
the United States court system.3 The Samantar decision clarified that foreign official
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2012; B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University, 2006. Thank you to my parents and sisters, Sarah and Mary-Beth, for always
providing me your support and encouragement.
1
See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 278–79 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing the
increased number of suits against foreign officials in foreign courts, as well as the increased
consciousness of violations of international law in the international community); Roger P.
Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 508–09 (2008) (explaining
that victims of human rights abuses pursue claims in foreign courts that are more amenable
to such claims).
2
130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
3
Id. See Curt Bradley, Samantar Insta-Symposium: Samantar and Foreign Official
Immunity, OPINIO JURIS (June 2, 2010, 9:51 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/06/02/samantar
-insta-symposium-samantar-and-foreign-official-immunity/ (“With its undefined references
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immunity determinations are not controlled by existing federal law, but left open a
heavy question: Who is actually responsible for deciding which officials can be tried
in United States courts?4 The Supreme Court renounced the responsibility of providing an answer and indicated it had no intention of forcing the determination on any
one branch.5 As a result, any of the three branches has the ability to take control of the
determination, yet each is hesitating. It is rare to see the branches of the United States
government politely ceding power to their counterparts.
This Note evaluates the ambiguity of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity
in the United States today and the interesting interplay of power between the branches
over the immunity determination, and argues that the Executive is the proper branch
of the government to control immunity determinations going forward. Ultimately, if
the Executive wants to maintain its power over this sensitive aspect of foreign policy,
the State Department must act before such action is precluded by Congress.
Part I begins by briefly discussing the principal case, Samantar v. Yousuf, which
provided the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve the circuit disagreement regarding foreign official immunity in United States courts, specifically whether the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act governs suits against foreign officials.6 Part II outlines the evolution and significance of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity in
the United States. An evaluation of the history reveals a strong, but not uniform, tendency of courts to defer to the executive branch in making foreign sovereign immunity
determinations, thus mixing both the judicial and executive branches of the government in the process. Part II also discusses the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA, or Act), which Congress enacted both to clarify the immunity doctrine
and relieve the State Department of the diplomatic pressures associated with making
suggestions as to immunity on behalf of the defendant states. A circuit split regarding the interpretation of the FSIA in cases against foreign officials emerged, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the divergence in Samantar. While the
decision resolved the split, it focused on state immunity without sorting out the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity as applied to heads of state. Part III addresses the
ambiguity in the doctrine after Samantar and the opportunity for each branch to take
control of immunity determinations, including the potential for congressional action
that would effectively seize at least some executive foreign policy power. This Note
argues that the executive branch is most qualified and equipped to make these sensitive foreign policy decisions. Finally, Part IV recommends that the executive branch
take immediate action to control immunity determinations in order to avoid preclusion.
The Executive should create and implement a framework for courts to follow when
a suit is filed against a foreign head of state to avoid potentially grave consequences
to common law immunity, and its lack of clarification regarding the role of international law,
the Court has invited years of litigation and law review articles.”).
4
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292–93.
5
Id. at 2291–92.
6
Id. at 2292.
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that could result from allowing the courts or Congress to subject foreign officials to
suit in the United States.
I. SAMANTAR V. YOUSUF : HIGHLIGHTING THE HEAD OF STATE IMMUNITY
PROBLEM IN UNITED STATES COURTS
In November of 1981, three Somali National Security Service (NSS) agents
abducted Bashe Abdi Yousuf, a young Somali businessman who was a member and
founder of UFFO, a community organization with the declared purpose of improving
conditions in local hospitals and schools in Hargeisa, Somalia.7 The NSS agents took
Yousuf to a detention facility, where he and other members of the group were interrogated and severely tortured.8 The NSS was administrated by the Supreme Revolutionary
Council (SRC), a group that, by coup, established authoritarian socialist rule in Somalia
in 1969.9 The SRC selected Mohamed Siad Barre, a Somali General, as its president
and spokesperson.10 At the direction of Siad Barre, military officers took control of
every part of the new government, including the Higher Judicial Council, the equivalent of the United States Supreme Court in Somalia.11 Throughout the Barre regime’s
rule in the 1980s, Somalia was controlled by an aggressive military dictatorship.12 The
regime’s rule was marked by violent civil war, bombings of towns and villages without
regard for civilians, a corrupt judicial system, and no rule of law.13 Further, the Barre
regime sought to suppress various opposing clans throughout the country, including
the Issaq clan, of which Yousuf and his fellow plaintiffs were members.14
During Yousuf’s three-month detention, NSS agents and military policemen
interrogated him, employing various torture methods including waterboarding,15
electrocution, and a form of torture known as the “Mig,”16 whereby the victim’s
hands and feet are tied together behind his back so that his body is arched backward
into a “U” shape with a heavy rock resting on his back, causing intense physical pain.17
The interrogators aggressively questioned Yousuf about UFFO, seeking admission
7

Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2007 WL 2220579, at *3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2007).
Id. at *3.
9
Id. at *1.
10
See Brief of Amici Curiae Academic Experts in Somali History and Current Affairs
in Support of Respondents at 7, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555)
[hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae].
11
Id. at 16.
12
See id. at 6–19 (discussing the Siad Barre regime and its atrocities against civilians).
13
See id. at 11–16.
14
See Yousuf, 2007 WL 2220579, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2007); Brief of Amici Curiae,
supra note 10, at 11–15.
15
Yousuf, 2007 WL 2220579, at *3.
16
Id. at *3 n.6 (noting that this torture method got its name from the resemblance between
the shape of the victim’s body and the Somali Air Force’s MIG aircraft).
17
Id. at *3.
8
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that its members were involved in an antigovernment scheme.18 Yousuf refused to
confess to any crime and, as a result, was charged with high treason,19 a crime that carried the death penalty under the national security laws enacted by the Barre regime.20
Yousuf later pleaded not guilty during the trial against him and twenty-eight other men
for various national security crimes.21 Yousuf was sentenced to twenty years in prison
and was held in solitary confinement in a six-by-six-foot cell for more than six years
in almost total darkness.22 Upon release, Yousuf promptly fled Somalia, eventually
moving to the United States and becoming a naturalized citizen.23
On November 10, 2004, Yousuf, along with seven fellow Somali torture victims,24
filed a civil action against Mohamed Ali Samantar, a leader of the Barre regime at
the time of their detention and torture25 in the District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia pursuant to the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA)26 and the
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).27 Samantar held several positions throughout the time
the SRC controlled Somalia, including First Vice President, Minister of Defense, and
Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Somalia.28 The plaintiffs to the suit alleged that Samantar knew or should have known of the torture, extrajudicial killing,
and arbitrary detention of themselves or members of their families, and that he aided
and abetted the commission of these offenses.29 Samantar was in charge of the armed
forces of the military regime that controlled Somalia at the time of the offenses, but fled
the country after the regime’s collapse in 1991.30 Samantar settled in Fairfax, Virginia,
allowing Yousuf to initiate suit against Samantar in the United States.31
18

Id.
First Amended Complaint at 10, Yousuf, 2007 WL 2220579 (1:04cv1360).
20
See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 10, at 17.
21
Yousuf, 2007 WL 2220579, at *4. The trial was held at the National Security Court, a
military court with jurisdiction over claims against civilians for national security and political
offenses. Id.
22
Id. The State Department documented substantial human rights violations by the Somali
government at the time. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1989, at 321–26 (1990).
23
Yousuf, 2007 WL 2220579, at *3–4.
24
Id. at *3–5 (describing each of the plaintiffs in the case, their claims of abuse, and their
alleged injuries).
25
Id. at *1.
26
Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
27
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). This statute is also sometimes referred to as the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS).
28
Yousuf, 2007 WL 2220579, at *1, *6. The United States has recognized the State of
Somalia and the Barre regime, but did not recognize any entity as the government of Somalia
at the time of the offense. The United States continues to hold this position today. See Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 4 n.3, Samantar v. Yousuf,
130 S. Ct., 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555) [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
29
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2282–83.
30
Id. at 2283.
31
See id.; Yousuf, 2007 WL 2220579, at *6.
19

2012]

AN UNUSUAL SEPARATION OF POWER EPISODE

959

Samantar argued that, as Somalia’s former Minister of Defense and Prime Minister,
he was entitled to immunity from suit in American courts under the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976.32 The district court stayed the proceedings to determine whether
the State Department intended to provide the court with a statement of interest33 regarding Samantar’s possible entitlement to sovereign immunity.34 After two years of silence
from the State Department, the court reinstated the case and held that the FSIA provided
immunity to “an individual acting in his official capacity on behalf of a foreign state,”
but not to “an official who acts beyond the scope of his authority.”35 The court concluded that Samantar was entitled to immunity under this reading and that, as a result,
the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case.36 Samantar’s motion
to dismiss was granted.37
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, rejecting the district court’s
interpretation of the FSIA.38 It found that the language and structure of the FSIA did
not provide immunity to individual foreign government agents.39 In June of 2010, the
Supreme Court issued an opinion agreeing with the Fourth Circuit. The Court based
its ruling mainly on a textual evaluation of the FSIA, but also found support in the
underlying purpose of the statute and the congressional intent.40
The ultimate result of the Supreme Court’s decision was a clear determination
that FSIA does not afford foreign officials or heads of state absolute immunity from
suit in American courts.41 Human rights groups were elated and declared victory,42 but
the effects of the case are not, in fact, as favorable as they had hoped. The Court explicitly stated it had no intention of eliminating the State Department’s role in immunity
determinations and said almost nothing about how the foreign official immunity determinations are to be made going forward.43 The question of whether human rights
abusers who are present or live in the United States can be sued for their crimes abroad
via the United States court system is left unanswered. Yousuf and his co-plaintiffs
32

Yousuf, 2007 WL 2220579, at *6; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 (2000).
See infra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
34
Yousuf, 2007 WL 2220579, at *6.
35
Id. at *8 (quoting Velasco v. Gov’t of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004)).
36
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2283.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 2283–84.
39
Id. The court also offered an alternative basis for its decision, specifically, that even if the
FSIA applies to a current official, a former official is not covered. Id. at 2284 n.5. Because the
Supreme Court agreed that individual officials are not covered by the FSIA, it found the status
of the official to be irrelevant. Id.
40
Id. at 2285–93.
41
Id. at 2292.
42
See, e.g., US Supreme Court Allows Suit to Proceed against Former Somali Minister
of Defense, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 1, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/01/us
-supreme-court-allows-suit-proceed-against-former-somali-minister-defense.
43
Id. at 2291 n.19 (leaving the process to be determined by the State Department).
33
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will have to re-try their case in district court before they can be sure whether they will
find justice.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
International law constantly seeks balance between independence and equality
through rules that are intended to maintain peaceful and cooperative relationships between nations.44 The heart of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity is political,
and its purpose is the protection of diplomatic relationships.45 Historically, the ability
of a state leader to travel to foreign countries to conduct official duties without fear of
detention by another state was seen as an essential guarantee to facilitate cooperation
amongst nations.46 Since the emergence of international law, holding a state official
accountable in domestic courts has been seen as an infringement on sovereignty and
damaging to diplomatic relations.47 To assert control over another sovereign without its
consent would undoubtedly cause tension. Increasing commercial interaction amongst
states has created the need for regulations of state actions, and enforcement of those
rights necessarily follows.48
The application of both statutory and the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity in United States courts has not always been clear and has evolved over time. A
brief history of the doctrine in the United States court system reveals a unique relationship between the courts and the State Department in making immunity determinations.
This process started out as a practical model, but has become burdensome, and perhaps
even unjust, over time.
A. Origins of Absolute Sovereign Immunity in the United States
Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon49
was the first Supreme Court statement of the rule of foreign state immunity in the
United States and has become the foundation of United States jurisprudence on the
44

See Jon M. Van Dyke, The Role of Customary International Law in Federal and State
Court Litigation, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 361 (2004), reprinted in JORDAN J. PAUST, ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 2–3 (3d ed. 2009).
45
See Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (explaining that sovereign immunity
is meant to preserve relations with friendly sovereigns by not “assuming an antagonistic
jurisdiction”); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943) (same).
46
Michael A. Tunks, Note, Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of Head-ofState Immunity, 52 DUKE L.J. 651, 656 (2002).
47
See Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35.
48
See ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1 (2008) (noting
that globalization has created the need for the rights of private citizens to be adjudicated).
49
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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subject.50 The Schooner Exchange involved the question of whether an American
citizen, in an American court, could assert title to a public national vessel of France
while it was within United States waters.51 The Chief Justice gave weight to the international law concept of state sovereignty, first recognizing that each nation has
“exclusive and absolute” jurisdiction over its own territory.52 He described the world
as being composed of distinct states “possessing equal rights and equal independence,”
which were not subject to the jurisdiction of other states unless they provided consent.53
Marshall famously wrote:
One sovereign being in no respect amendable to another; and being
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the
dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights
within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the confidence
that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station,
though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and
will be extended to him.54
Every state, therefore, was said to have waived jurisdiction over claims against other
foreign sovereigns by implied consent, and so it followed that no state was subject to
the jurisdiction of another state unless that first state so consented.55 The rationale was
that the waiver of jurisdiction was in the common interest of states, as they gained
mutual benefit from engaging in intercourse with each other and benefited from a continued good relationship in this intercourse.56 The Court extended its reasoning to
include representatives of foreign states, explaining that nations should be assured
that their representatives will be immune from suit to make certain that they are not
inhibited in performing their diplomatic functions.57
50

Id.; see also Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688 (2004) (noting that Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in Schooner Exchange is considered the origin of United States foreign
sovereign immunity jurisprudence); ALEBEEK, supra note 48, at 12 (stating that Schooner
Exchange was the first judicial determination concerning foreign state immunity). The reasoning of the opinion has also become the basis for rules of immunity in other common law
jurisdictions. HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 204 (2d ed. 2008).
51
Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 135. In December of 1810, the French navy seized the
schooner Exchange, a ship that was owned by U.S. nationals who were traveling from the United
States. When the ship later made a stop in the port of Philadelphia, the original owners filed suit
in a United States court to assert their right to the property. ALEBEEK, supra note 48, at 12.
52
Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 137.
55
Id. at 136–37; Erika M. Lopes, Comment, Seeking Accountability and Justice for Torture
Victims: The Hurdle of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Suing Foreign Officials
under the Torture Victims Protection Act, 6 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 389, 396 (2010).
56
Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136.
57
Id. at 138–39; see, e.g., Lopes, supra note 55, at 397; Tunks, supra note 46, at 654.
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The Chief Justice made it clear that the Constitution did not require the grant of
immunity to foreign sovereigns.58 Rather, the shield has been held to be “a matter of
grace and comity on the part of the United States.”59 Since the Constitution does not
require courts to hear claims based on the law of nations, the abstention of courts from
doing so based on immunity is perfectly constitutional.60 Despite its narrow holding
and the lack of constitutional authority, The Schooner Exchange “came to be regarded
as extending virtually absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns,”61 and became the
basis for the common law doctrine of immunity in the United States.62 Following the
decision, courts routinely granted immunity to foreign sovereigns with few exceptions
for almost a century and a half.63
B. Judicial Deference to the Executive
As early as The Schooner Exchange, the State Department seemingly crossed
the boundary between the Executive and Judiciary to influence the immunity determinations of the courts.64 For example, in The Schooner Exchange, the United States
Attorney General urged the courts to dismiss the action in recognition of the relationship between the United States and France,65 a concern the Court found influential.66 In
observance of the holding in this landmark case, subsequent courts developed a twopronged procedure to determine whether a foreign official or state was entitled to
immunity.67 First, the diplomatic representative of the sovereign could contact the State
Department to request immunity from suit.68 If the State Department chose to honor this
request or, for its own reasons, preferred to settle the claim by diplomatic negotiations
rather than by litigation in the courts, the Department would issue a “suggestion of
58

See Heather L. Williams, Comment, Does an Individual Government Official Qualify
for Immunity Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?: A Human Rights-Based Approach
to Resolving a Problematic Circuit Split, 69 MD. L. REV. 587, 591 (2010) (quoting Verlinden
B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)).
59
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486.
60
See, e.g., MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
335 (2007).
61
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486. The absolute theory of sovereign immunity is sometimes
referred to as the “classical theory of sovereign immunity.” See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting
Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Att. Gen., Dep’t of Justice (May 19,
1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984, 984 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter].
62
See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486.
63
See, e.g., Williams, supra note 58, at 591–92.
64
See PAUST ET AL., supra note 44, at 765; see also infra note 128 and accompanying text.
65
PAUST ET AL., supra note 44, at 765.
66
See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 143 (1812).
67
See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284–85 (2010).
68
See id. at 2284.
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immunity” to the court.69 The court would then surrender its jurisdiction over the case
and promptly terminate the proceedings.70
The second prong of the procedure was triggered when the State Department did
not issue a suggestion of immunity or statement of interest to the court.71 In this
situation, the district court “had authority to decide for itself whether all the requisites for such immunity existed.”72 The court would then evaluate “whether the ground
of immunity is one which it is the established policy of the [State Department] to
recognize.”73 Courts were careful not to extend immunity when the State Department
had not done so in the past under similar circumstances, for fear of intervening in the
Executive’s pursuit of national interests.74 As a result of the two-pronged procedure,
“sovereign immunity determinations were made in two different branches, subject to
a variety of factors, sometimes including diplomatic considerations. Not surprisingly,
the governing standards were neither clear nor uniformly applied.”75
This procedure evidenced the Judiciary’s great willingness to defer to the
Executive in the realm of foreign relations, allowing the Executive to influence
jurisdiction—an inherently judicial determination—on the basis of political considerations. Courts frequently recognized the executive branch, acting through the
State Department, as “the political arm of the Government charged with the conduct
of our foreign affairs,”76 and freely relinquished its power to grant or prohibit immunity when the State Department had not acted.77 The policy behind the procedure,
69

Id.
See Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945) (opining that courts should terminate
judicial proceedings when the executive branch feels that diplomatic measures should be
taken rather than the use of adjudication).
The case involves the dignity and rights of a friendly sovereign state,
claims against which are normally presented and settled in the course of
the conduct of foreign affairs by the President and by the Department of
State. When the Secretary elects . . . to settle claims against the vessel
by diplomatic negotiations between the two countries rather than by
continued litigation in the courts, it is of public importance that the
action of the political arm of the Government taken within its appropriate sphere be promptly recognized, and that the delay and inconvenience of a prolonged litigation be avoided by prompt termination of
the proceedings in the district court.
Id.; see also Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1943).
71
See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2284.
72
Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 587.
73
Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36; see Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2284.
74
See, e.g., Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 36.
75
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 (1983).
76
Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588.
77
Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35 (“It is . . . not for the courts to deny an immunity which our
government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize.”).
70
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recognized by both the courts and the State Department, was that the interests of the
United States were “better served . . . if the wrongs to suitors . . . are righted through
diplomatic negotiations rather than by compulsions of judicial proceedings.”78 The
interests of the victims, therefore, were often sacrificed to those of the United States
government and its foreign associate.
At first glance, this level of influence seems appealing for the Executive, but
with this power came consequences, including the political pressure placed on the
State Department by foreign nations.79 The State Department, following the lead of
several other foreign nations, decided that a different approach to foreign sovereign
immunity might be more prudent.80
C. The Tate Letter: Adoption of the Restrictive Theory of Immunity
During the twentieth century, the practice of states around the world began to
shift from adherence to the theory of absolute sovereign immunity to a more restrictive approach.81 As global commerce grew, states recognized the need for adjudication
of claims arising from the commercial activities of states and their instrumentalities.82
Allowing states to engage in commercial activities with the protection of immunity
and without any consequence for illegal acts was seen as an unfair advantage over
private commercial enterprises.83 The new restrictive approach to sovereign immunity allowed for an exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine: domestic courts
could now exercise jurisdiction over claims brought against a foreign state that arose
from commercial activities.84
Until this time, questions of sovereign immunity in the United States were
answered primarily by the State Department, and, generally, immunity was afforded
to friendly foreign sovereigns in all actions.85 In 1952, following the lead of several
other states, the State Department announced a definitive change to its foreign sovereign immunity policy through a letter to the Department of Justice, later named the
78

Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 589.
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.
80
See Williams, supra note 58, at 595 (noting that the restrictive theory of immunity
eventually adopted by the United States matched “the approach of nearly every other
country—where decisions as to foreign sovereign immunity were exclusively judicial rather
than political”).
81
Gerald L. Neuman, The Abiding Significance of Law in Foreign Relations, 2004 SUP.
CT. REV. 111, 120 (2004).
82
JENNIFER K. ELSEA & JORDAN E. SEGALL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41379, SAMANTAR
V. YOUSUF: THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT AND FOREIGN OFFICIALS 2 (2010).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (observing the
history of State Department awards of sovereign immunity).
79
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“Tate Letter.”86 The letter expressed the Executive’s intention to adopt the restrictive
form of sovereign immunity, meaning that courts should “not grant immunity to a
foreign sovereign in suits arising out of private or commercial activity.”87 The letter explained that “[a]ccording to the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the
immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts . . .
of a state, but not with respect to private acts.”88 The letter made clear the Executive’s
intention to allow the United States courts to adjudicate claims arising out of commercial enterprise.89
Despite this definitive language, the letter made a qualification when it said that
it would be the “[State] Department’s policy to follow the restrictive theory . . . in
the consideration of requests . . . for a grant of sovereign immunity.”90 In reality,
while the letter marked a significant change in policy, it did not change the procedural approach to the determination, and, as a result, the application of the restrictive theory in the courts proved to be problematic.91 When foreign sovereigns were
served, they continued to exert pressure on the State Department for immunity, and
the Department continued to issue suggestions of immunity to the courts, even in
cases where the restrictive theory should have made immunity unavailable.92 When
a sovereign state did not petition the State Department for immunity, courts were
required to independently determine immunity, creating further inconsistencies.93
Since the Tate Letter, “the clear trend” has been toward a more limited application of foreign sovereign immunity.94 A large contributing factor to the strength
of this trend in the United States has been the codification of the restrictive approach
to the doctrine in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.95 Congress passed
the FSIA as a reaction to both the development of this trend around the world and the
inconsistent application of immunity in the United States.96 The FSIA, however, did not
clearly answer several questions raised by the sovereign immunity doctrine in United
States courts, including whether foreign officials were entitled to immunity, who should
determine whether officials are entitled, or how the determination should be made. The
Court in Samantar dissected the statute to determine that it does not govern whether
a foreign official is entitled to immunity, thereby limiting the scope of the Act.97
86

Tate Letter, supra note 61; see Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.
Lopes, supra note 55, at 401; see also Tate Letter, supra note 61.
88
Tate Letter, supra note 61, at 984.
89
See Lopes, supra note 55, at 401.
90
Tate Letter, supra note 61 (emphasis added).
91
See Lopes, supra note 55, at 402; see also Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487.
92
Id.
93
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 487–88 (discussing how standards were not uniformly applied).
94
David P. Stewart, Immunity and Accountability: More Continuity Than Change?, 99
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 227, 228 (2005).
95
See id.
96
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488 (discussing the objectives of the FSIA).
97
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2284, 2292 (2010).
87
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D. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Circuit Confusion Over Foreign
Official Immunity
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity developed as a matter of common
law, and the FSIA served, in part, as codification of the restrictive approach to the
doctrine.98 Congress drafted the FSIA in order to provide a forum for adjudication
of disputes arising from commercial or private acts of a state, and also to clarify the
standards for determining when immunity should be granted.99 Congress stated several main purposes for the legislation, including the formal adoption of the restrictive approach as set down in the Tate Letter.100 Another central purpose of the statute
was the desire to remove the political dynamic that had previously influenced the
determination.101 Congress sought to remove the immunity determination from the
executive branch, instead locating the determination exclusively within the power
of the judicial branch.102 By removing from the State Department the responsibility
for making suggestions of immunity, Congress hoped to relieve the political pressure that was being placed on the Department by defendant states and free the executive branch from “any adverse consequences resulting from an unwillingness . . . to
support that immunity.”103 Congress also wanted to assure litigants that immunity determinations were “made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure
[sic] due process.”104 By enacting the FSIA, Congress attempted to “depoliticize the
field by codifying legal standards that courts could apply impartially.”105
The statute confined the grant of immunity to suits “involving a foreign state’s
public acts . . . and [did] not extend [the grant] to suits based on [the state’s] commercial or private acts.”106 The State Department approved of usurpation of its
98

Id. at 2284–85; Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488; WALTER FLOWERS, JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES
COURTS IN SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605.
100
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 8. The formation of procedures to establish personal jurisdiction over a foreign state and to provide a means for obtaining judgments over a defendant
state were other stated purposes of the Act. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976).
101
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7; see Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2285 (explaining the “Act’s
two primary purposes: (1) to endorse and codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity,
and (2) to transfer primary responsibility for deciding ‘claims of foreign states to immunity’
from the State Department to the courts.”) (citation omitted); FOX, supra note 50 at 317 (“A
principal purpose of the legislation was to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity
from the executive to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications and
providing legal standards and due process procedures.”).
102
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Neuman, supra note 81, at 121.
106
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7.
99
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influence over the immunity determination for these acts.107 The statute was not clear,
however, on whether the immunity determination of a foreign official, acting in his
or her public or private capacity, was to be governed by legislation and, therefore,
determined solely by the courts and by the same standards the court would apply to
a state. A split developed in the federal circuits with regard to this question.108
E. Resolution of the Circuit Split
In Samantar, the Fourth Circuit followed the minority of circuits when it held
that the FSIA does not provide immunity to former heads of state, preserving the
Executive’s role in these immunity determinations.109 The Supreme Court agreed.110
In a detailed evaluation of the text of the statute, the Court found that Congress did not
intend to include a foreign official within the meaning of a “foreign state,” and further emphasized that “the legislative history points toward an intent to leave official
immunity outside the scope of the Act.”111 The Court did not distinguish between former and current heads of state, concluding that the FSIA did not govern the immunity
determinations of foreign officials;112 rather, it only addressed foreign states.113 In
essence, the Court held that the common law doctrine would continue to control.
The Court provided no guidance on the critical issue of how to determine whether
foreign officials are entitled to immunity, an issue the common law leaves unclear.
It is unsurprising that the Court showed restraint, since the Judiciary has almost
always dodged the issue of immunity and deferred to the Executive. Although the
Court found “no reason to believe that Congress saw a problem [with], or wanted
to eliminate, the State Department’s role in determinations regarding individual official immunity,” it did not provide any guidance as to what role the State Department
should play going forward.114 Unlike some other cases before it, the Samantar decision did not address the Judiciary’s potential interference with the Executive’s
exercise of political power when making immunity determinations, separation of
powers concerns if Congress were to create legislation on the issue, or the issue of
judicial independence.115 Samantar leaves many questions unanswered: Is a former
head of state present in the United States immune from suit for serious human rights
offenses? Should foreign officials living in the United States be held accountable for
human rights abuses even if the suit would offend the official’s home state? What
107

Id. at 6.
See Lopes, supra note 55, at 404–09.
109
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2283–84 (2010).
110
Id. at 2282.
111
Id. at 2291.
112
Id. at 2284 n.5.
113
Id. at 2285–93.
114
Id. at 2291.
115
See Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 734 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Neuman,
supra note 81, at 123.
108
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branch of government has control over head of state immunity determinations? The
Supreme Court simply stated that any issue related to foreign sovereign immunity
should first be argued in district court.116 What is clear after Samantar is the need
for further development of the foreign official immunity doctrine.
III. IMMUNITY DETERMINATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES POST-SAMANTAR:
WHY THE EXECUTIVE MUST ASSERT CONTROL
Having decided that the FSIA did not address heads of state, the Supreme Court
avoided tackling the difficult question of how head of state immunity determinations
should be made internationally or in the United States going forward.117 The only
guidance the Samantar decision provided for head of state immunity determinations
was that the common law may still apply.118 The Court left the problems associated
with the application of the common law to be resolved by the district courts.119 As
a result, the Judiciary, Executive and Legislature all have the power to influence the
utility of the doctrine going forward. Although courts may have influence over the
implementation of the doctrine, it is more likely that the real fight for control over
the immunity determinations will arise between the Legislature and the Executive.
In the meantime, the courts with suits against foreign officials on their dockets are
left with little direction about the proper steps to take to adjudicate the claims.
A. The Common Law Approach: Determinations in the Judiciary, Growing
Litigation and Little Guidance
Amplifying the problem of an unclear head of state immunity doctrine in the
United States is the probable increase in the number of these cases in federal courts.
For victims of human rights abuses in many countries around the world, litigation for
these crimes in their home country is impossible.120 Without a special criminal tribunal created by treaty, these victims have no recourse other than filing suit in a
country capable of and willing to adjudicate claims against foreign sovereigns.121
116

Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292–93.
Id. at 2290 n.14; William S. Dodge, Samantar Insta-Symposium: What Samantar
Doesn’t Decide, OPINIO JURIS (June 2, 2010, 8:42 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/06/02
/samantar-insta-symposium-what-samantar-doesn%e2%80%99t-decide/ (noting that the Court
was not required to address the future of the immunity determination); see Bradley, supra
note 3 (noting the lack of discussion about international law in the Samantar opinion); cf.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (discussing international law at length in order to
determine whether the procedures of the military commission violated the Uniform Military
Code of Justice and international law as enumerated by the Geneva Conventions).
118
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292–93.
119
Id.
120
See, e.g., Alford, supra note 1, at 508.
121
Id.
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After the initial enactment of the FSIA, there was a considerable increase in litigation against foreign parties in United States courts.122 Although this increase can
be partly attributed to the increase in commercial suits, tied to increased economic
activity of states, it is significant that a substantial portion of claims were not commercial contract claims brought against a state.123 Instead, many of the claims were
brought against foreign officials for conduct that was “personal and unconnected
with any governmental duties,”124 including claims under the Alien Tort Statute and
the Torture Victim Protection Act.125 This influx shows that with any new reduction
in the immunity doctrine in the United States, a wave of new plaintiffs seeking redress will come forward.126 This trend highlights the Judiciary’s need for clarity regarding the application of the immunity doctrine after Samantar.
Without much judicial guidance regarding the determinations, the only comfortable approach for the lower courts to follow is the common law precedent. As noted
previously, the Judiciary is hesitant when it faces the prospect of holding foreign
leaders accountable without Executive endorsement.127 Courts have repeatedly recognized foreign relations as a politically charged area of the law and expressed the
view that it is best addressed in the political branches of the government.128 The
122

See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that “with
greater incidence, foreign state officials are accused of wrongful conduct arising not just
from private commercial ventures, but from alleged criminal activity and abuses of human
rights in violation of customary international law”).
123
Id. at 278.
124
Id.
125
See id. at 280.
126
In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993), Scott Nelson sued the Saudi government for personal injury resulting from unlawful detention and torture. Id. at 349. After
being recruited and hired in the United States by the Saudi government, Nelson traveled to
Riyadh to begin his employment as a systems engineer at King Faisal Specialist Hospital.
Id. at 352. One year later, the Saudi Government arrested, detained, and tortured Nelson for
reporting safety defects at the hospital. Id. at 352–53. The Supreme Court held that the district
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the suit because the FSIA granted the government immunity because the unlawful acts and torture committed by the Saudi Government
were not “based upon commercial activity” within the meaning of the FSIA. Id. at 349.
Because the FSIA is the “sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state” in the
United States, and Nelson did not bring a suit pursuant to one of the immunity exceptions in
the statute, immunity had to be granted. Id. at 355 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989)).
127
See Tunks, supra note 46, at 668; cf. Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (rejecting
the State Department’s recommendation when determining whether pre-FSIA conduct should
be governed by the statute). In his opinion in Altmann, Justice Stevens expressed some distaste for the involvement of the State Department in immunity determinations, stating, “[w]hile
the United States’ views on such an issue are of considerable interest to the Court, they merit
no special deference.” Id. at 701.
128
See Doe v. United States, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S.
30, 35 (1945). Judicial deference to executive decisions that are political in nature was expressed as early as Marbury v. Madison. According to Marbury, the judicial power does not
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Samantar Court expresses almost nothing along this line of reasoning, presumably
in order to leave any discussion of the “foreign policy power” out of the equation.129
Without any new guidance, the courts must simply follow the flawed common law
procedure already in place.130 To make matters worse, the procedure only becomes
more difficult to apply over time because the United States’ relationships with states,
as well as non-nation states, are often complicated and always evolving.
Courts have little experience making foreign policy decisions and often wait years
for State Department guidance before allowing a case to move forward.131 Without
Executive recommendations, courts make inconsistent determinations, leading to
more confusion and frustration.132 Further, the Judiciary cannot be held politically
accountable for such decisions, unlike the State Department. Leaving the determination to the courts only exacerbates the problems that have been noted for years,
including delays in the court system, inconsistent determinations, lack of clarity of
the doctrine, and the injustice of denying the complaining parties’ rightful causes of
action under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victims Protection Act.133
The common law approach forced Yousuf to wait two years for State Department
intervention before the district court finally allowed his case to move forward despite
the Department’s silence.134 In February of 2011, after the Supreme Court’s decision
to remand the case back to the district court for another look at the immunity determination, the State Department finally filed a statement of interest in the case.135
It is difficult to conclude that the United States court system has provided justice to
a plaintiff who has been forced to endure more than six years of litigation before his
claim has even been heard. This Note argues that the continued application of the common law doctrine is not the best option for dealing with cases against foreign officials
authorize courts to question the discretion of the Executive regarding foreign policy decisions.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with
certain important political powers; in the exercise of which he is to use
his own discretion . . . . [W]hatever opinion may be entertained of the
manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and
can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political.
They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to
the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.
Id.
129
See generally Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
130
See Brief for the United States, supra note 28, at *6.
131
See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2283.
132
See Statement of Interest of the United States at 2, Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04 CV
1360 (E.D. Va. Feb. 14, 2011) (highlighting the case’s procedural history with numerous
reversals and remands).
133
See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487–88 (1983); Tachiova
v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
134
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2283.
135
See Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 132.
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going forward. Instead, the executive branch must develop a framework that removes
the determination from the courts and facilitates faster and more consistent immunity determinations while addressing sensitive foreign policy considerations.
B. Possible Congressional Control Over the Determination Process
The Samantar decision does not expressly address the role of Congress in shaping immunity determinations going forward, but it also does not call into question
Congress’s ability to enact such statutes.136 Congress has the power to codify a process for foreign official immunity determinations, and it is possible that Congress
has the desire to do so.137 While it is unlikely that Congress intended the FSIA to be
the complete framework on which foreign-official immunity determinations are to
be based, Congress has expressed aversion toward the State Department’s political
involvement in certain cases against foreign officials, instead favoring determinations based on legal standards.138 The critical problem is that a statutory scheme
controlling the immunity of officials will likely overlook many important and
sensitive aspects of the doctrine that would result in negative foreign policy implications for the United States government. An attempt to provide the sole means for
official immunity will almost certainly be met with opposition from the executive
branch. Nonetheless, Congress has two possible avenues for codifying the immunity
determination process.139
First, Congress can create a new exception to the FSIA that will govern the
question of whether foreign officials are entitled to immunity. An amendment to the
definition of “foreign state” in the FSIA to include former officials acting in their
official capacities would make the jurisdictional determination for officials the same
as that for states.140 Alternatively, Congress could create a new exception in the
136

ELSEA & SEGALL, supra note 82, at 14–17.
WALTER FLOWERS, JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS IN SUITS AGAINST
FOREIGN STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7–8 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6605–06.
138
See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291 (noting that “the legislative history points toward an
intent to leave official immunity outside the scope of the Act”); Brief for the United States,
supra note 28, at 27 (stating that “[n]othing in the FSIA suggests that Congress intended to
accord immunity to current officials but not former officials”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7
(explaining that Congress intended to move “the determination of sovereign immunity from
the executive branch to the judicial branch” in order to ensure that “crucial decisions are
made on purely legal grounds”).
139
See Brief for the United States, supra note 28, at 27 (arguing that the executive
branch’s determinations, informed by customary international law, govern the law of
immunity, at least when officials are acting in their official capacity).
140
The FSIA currently defines “foreign state” as “a political subdivision of a foreign state
or an agency or instrumentality or a foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976). The Samantar
Court decided that the terms “agency or instrumentality” do not include an individual official.
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2286–87.
137
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statute to apply to foreign officials specifically. With either of these actions, Congress
would place foreign official immunity determinations in the hands of the courts, in the
same way courts are presently empowered to deal with the commercial acts of states.
Congress can also pass new statutes that govern immunity determinations. The
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act,141 for example, is a proposed bill that
would provide courts jurisdiction over private causes of action against foreign states
and officials who commit “extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking,
terrorism or the provision of material support or resources . . . for such an act.”142
This law would allow victims to bring suits against foreign officials into United
States courts.143 While the proposed statute would require that the state be substituted for the foreign official acting in his or her official capacity as the defendant in
the suit,144 Congress would still be side-stepping the Executive’s consideration of
the foreign policy implications associated with subjecting states to suit based on
more than just their commercial activities.
Congress could take these actions to limit, or even extinguish, the role of the
Executive in the immunity determination because such legislation would eliminate
the need for courts to rely on the State Department’s suggestions of immunity.145
The foreign policy power debate is implicated in this struggle.146 It is generally established that the courtroom is not the place where foreign affairs decisions should
be made.147 It is seen as dangerous for courts to undermine or second-guess foreign
policy decisions of the President, since the Executive is the branch primarily charged
with these decisions and is the branch that has the relevant information to do so
effectively.148 It has also been argued that it is dangerous for the Legislature, rather
than the President, to exercise power over United States foreign policy, especially
when the issues are fact-specific rather than broad policy initiatives.149
141

S. 2930, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010). The current version of this bill, S.1894, 112th Cong.
(2011), is now pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
142
Id.; ELSEA & SEGALL, supra note 82, at 14–15.
143
S. 2930, § 2; ELSEA & SEGALL, supra note 82, at 15.
144
S. 2930, § 4(a) (“[A]ny claim based on an act or omission of an official or employee of
a foreign state or of an official or employee of an organ of a foreign state, while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, shall be asserted against the foreign state or organ of
the foreign state.”).
145
See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
146
See RAMSEY, supra note 60, at 321.
147
Id.; cf. A. Mark Weisburd, Affecting Foreign Affairs is Not the Same as Making Foreign
Policy: A Comment on Judicial Foreign Policy, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 197, 207 (2008) (concluding that it would be appropriate for the court to hear some foreign policy cases, such as
“cases requiring nothing more than resolving factual disputes on the basis of evidence and
applying clear rules of decision to the facts so found”).
148
RAMSEY, supra note 60, at 321.
149
The Constitution does not grant Congress a “general foreign affairs power” but does
provide some enumerated powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1–17. “Congress [also] has [the]
derivative power to pass laws ‘necessary and proper’ to support other branches’ powers,”
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On the other hand, statutory codification of international law principles may
provide the United States with a more impartial means for adjudicating claims for
violations of international law against former heads of state while providing due
process to victims. Statutes that incorporate international law may not bring about
the same negative consequences feared by subjecting officials to suit because the international community as a whole supports the exercise of universal jurisdiction
and prosecution of former officials for crimes like genocide and other jus cogens
violations.150 Also, there is no indication that the Supreme Court would find this
congressional action constitutionally offensive.151 One way for Congress to implement such a statute can be illustrated by the Genocide Accountability Act (GAA).152
In 2007, Congress passed the GAA, which codified the Genocide Convention in the
United States.153 The GAA “expand[ed] the jurisdictional bases of the U.S. law criminalizing genocide . . . to allow prosecution of any perpetrator of genocide found in
the U.S.”154 A foreign official sued under this statute would claim immunity, but if
Congress made it clear that immunity would not be granted for the crime of genocide,
there would be no place for a State Department suggestion of immunity in the determination, thereby removing the executive branch from the decision.155
Congress has several constitutionally permissible options that have some benefits,
but all have negative consequences. Congress can amend the FSIA to allow for officials to be sued based on specific criminal acts, or Congress can pass new statutes
that incorporate international law treaties and subject officials to suit through the criminalization of certain specific and widely accepted international law violations.156 The
latter approach has a stronger foundation than the former, which may make the prosecution of the individual more legitimate, possibly reducing some of the foreign policy ramifications of the suit. Despite the benefits of making immunity determinations
meaning that Congress could exercise some foreign affairs powers but would have to act in
coordination with the Executive. RAMSEY, supra note 60, at 208.
150
PAUST, supra note 44, at 3–4 (defining jus cogens (commanding law) as peremptory norms).
151
See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Jan. 12,
1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that United States courts can adjudicate tort claims
between aliens even when neither the crime nor the parties have any connection to the United
States, so long as the violations alleged are of “well-established, universally recognized
norms of international law.” Id. at 888.
152
Pub. L. No. 110-151, 121 Stat. 1821 (2007).
153
Id.
154
Zachary Pall, The Genocide Accountability Act and U.S. Law: The Evolution and
Lessons of Universal Jurisdiction for Genocide, 3 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 13, 13 (2009).
155
See John Bellinger, Immunities, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 18, 2007, 7:00 AM), http://
opiniojuris.org/2007/01/18/immunities/ (explaining that “[t]he Executive Branch has a longstanding practice of affirmatively ‘suggesting’ head of state immunity to our courts when a
person who enjoys that immunity has been served with judicial process”).
156
See id.
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more consistent, clear, and efficient for the courts, either approach is still overinclusive.
Codification of the immunity determination process would not account for the important political factors that play into the sensitive relationships the Executive must
manage around the world, or the serious reciprocity implications that will likely result from automatically subjecting officials to suit by statute.157 Further, codification
would remove any possibility of the settlement of claims through diplomatic negotiations, a powerful conciliatory tool for the Executive.
Ultimately, the sensitive immunity analysis required in cases against foreign officials is best vested with the executive branch.158 Without case-by-case consideration
of the consequences of subjecting officials to suit in the United States, the executive
branch’s foreign policy agenda could sustain major damage.159 The Executive has the
pertinent information and foreign relations skills that are necessary to maintain positive global relationships.160 The executive branch can, and should, act before such congressional action is taken in order to maintain executive power in this area, avoid suits
against U.S. allies in its courts, and prevent reciprocity repercussions that could result
in U.S. officials being subject to suit abroad.161
C. Executive Control Over the Immunity Determination: The Best Branch
for the Job
The Executive has many interests at stake related to head of state immunity. First,
and most obviously, the executive branch is charged with creating and executing the
foreign policy for the country, including fostering relationships with other states
around the world.162 Without the ability to grant immunity to state officials sued in
United States courts, the executive branch loses some control over its ability to guarantee protection of its allies and maintain neutral relations with states with which it
may have sensitive relationships. Also, the executive branch will lose its ability to
engage in diplomatic negotiations as a possible means of resolving these suits.
The executive branch also has an interest in limiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts to prevent the United States court system from becoming a tribunal for
international crimes. Allowing any and all foreign officials from around the world
to be sued and punished in the United States is not a policy objective that a single
executive administration has ever endorsed.163 Congress has followed suit, refusing
157

See id.; ELSEA & SEGALL, supra note 82, at 15–16.
See ELSEA & SEGALL, supra note 82, at 12 (noting the Samantar Court’s placement of
responsibility on Executive branch principles in resolving these disputes).
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See id. at 12, 15–16.
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See id. at 12–13, 15–16.
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Id.
162
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
163
See Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 389, 392, 398 (2009) (explaining U.S. engagement policy
as being derived from the principle of subsidiarity or comity to other international entities).
158
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to ratify several human rights treaties that would require the United States to exercise universal jurisdiction to criminally prosecute foreign officials in the United
States court system.164 However, Congress did pass statutes such as the Aviation
Transportation and Security Act and Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act in order to provide redress for victims of intolerable crimes through civil suit
against perpetrators in the United States.165 The Executive must create some framework to deal with impending civil litigation against foreign officials pursuant to these
laws, while preserving its role in foreign official immunity determinations. At the same
time, the Executive must also be sure to prevent Congress from creating statutes that
would transform the U.S. court system into an international human rights tribunal.
The Executive also has an interest in protecting United States officials from
charges in foreign courts. Suggestions of immunity by the State Department in many
cases recognize the “special sensitivities of exposing [government leaders] to civil
litigation in foreign courts, particularly while they are still in office.”166 By recognizing these special sensitivities, the State Department avoids potentially dangerous foreign policy issues, including reciprocity repercussions.167 John Bellinger, former State
Department Legal Advisor, recognized that “[t]he sovereign and official immunity
rules the United States applies domestically have important implications for how the
United States and its officials are treated abroad. Thus immunity outcomes in [United
States] courts are relevant not merely because of the potential immediate foreign
policy consequences of U.S. exercises of jurisdiction.”168 The current United States
position when its officials are sued abroad is to simply assert immunity.169 If immunity determinations in United States courts were to be made by the courts without
any executive input, many more officials would be successfully sued in the United
States. This would result in an increase of countries that would no longer respect the
United States’ assertions of immunity for its own officials. Jeopardizing the immunity
of United States officials abroad is a risk that the Executive surely does not want to
take, especially in a time of war.
As Samantar indicates, it is unlikely that the Court will object to the State
Department making immunity determinations according to common law practices
going forward.170 The challenge for the Executive, then, rests in the balancing of
164

Id. at 391 (“[D]espite strong . . . human rights commitments, the United States has
appeared to flinch, even recoil, when it comes to direct domestic application of human rights
treaty norms . . . .”).
165
Aviation Transportation and Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001);
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.
1464 (2000).
166
Bellinger, supra note 155.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id. (“[The common law] approach . . . is more consistent with the position taken by the
United States on behalf of its own officials when they are sued abroad.”).
170
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2291 (2010).
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interests: the desire to maintain friendly relations with foreign states and to protect
United States officials abroad on one hand with the national interest of participation
in enforcement of international human rights norms and the need for impartial adjudication of civil suits based on human rights violations on the other hand.171 In order
to promote positive foreign relationships and to avoid being subject to constant political pressure, the State Department must grant immunity based on a more consistent framework that promotes the United States foreign policy agenda. As discussed
previously, the Executive must also act before it is excluded from the process by
federal legislation.172 Despite the strain on the State Department, the influence over
the determination of immunity for officials is a power that the Executive should
continue to preserve as its own. This Note recommends that the State Department
take full control of immunity determinations. The executive branch must dedicate
more resources to the State Department to make efficient immunity determinations
and must also create a framework that courts can apply with more consistency.
IV. RECOMMENDATION TO THE EXECUTIVE: STATE DEPARTMENT CONTROL
OVER FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY DETERMINATIONS
The arguments made during the Samantar case revealed the Executive’s desire
to keep some role in assessing sovereign immunity claims by foreign officials.173
These arguments rely on the foreign policy power of the executive branch and emphasize various reasons for keeping the immunity determinations as is.174 The Samantar
Court expressed no aversion to this position and suggested that lower courts respect
State Department suggestions of immunity on a case-by-case basis going forward.175
The Court also agreed with the Executive that the common law approach remains
in effect with respect to former officials.176 Following the common law, however, will
preserve the previous issues courts have faced with foreign state immunity determinations, including delays, inconsistencies, and injustices in the judicial process.177 Also,
the common law approach allows courts to act in contradiction of a State Department
suggestion of immunity, a result the Executive can avoid.178 Even worse, following the
common law allows for Congress to step in and codify the immunity determination,
171

See Melish, supra note 163, at 390 (“National public opinion polls . . . suggest that
roughly eighty percent of Americans believe that human rights inhere in every human being.
Equal numbers express . . . support for U.S. ratification of human rights treaties . . . .”
(footnote omitted)).
172
See supra Part III.B.
173
See Brief for the United States, supra note 28, at 6–7.
174
Id. at 8–27.
175
See Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291; ELSEA & SEGALL, supra note 82, at 12.
176
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2291.
177
See supra Part III.A.
178
See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (“[T]he governing standards [for immunity determinations] were neither clear nor uniformly applied.”).

2012]

AN UNUSUAL SEPARATION OF POWER EPISODE

977

keeping the Executive from having any role in this important foreign policy doctrine.179
The Executive must act to change the current procedure of immunity determinations
in courts today.
The State Department currently lacks the ability to make efficient immunity
determinations.180 Today, issuing a statement of interest to the courts can take several
months, or even years to complete.181 This kind of backlog in the court system is one
that Congress may seek to correct without consideration of the foreign policy consequences of its legislation.182 Also, the delay in a response from the United States
government creates uncertainty for the court and litigants, as well as a lack of faith
in the judicial processes of the federal courts. The Executive must dedicate more resources to the State Department so it can act quickly to issue suggestions of immunity
to district courts for each case. Increased resources will assure courts and litigants
that statements of interest will be issued in each case and within a shorter time frame.
More resources will also lessen the burden on the Department and reduce delays and
injustice in the court system.
In addition to greater resources for the State Department, the Executive should
create a framework that provides direction to courts adjudicating cases against foreign heads of state. Instead of the current common law approach, the Executive should
issue a statement to the Judiciary regarding the suggested process to follow when
a suit is filed against a foreign official. Most importantly, the framework should require that courts consider State Department statements of interest in every case. This
requirement will allow the Executive to maintain exclusive control over this component of foreign policy by preventing courts from making immunity determinations
of their own volition. Required statements of interest will also create certainty for the
courts and litigants.
Other details of the framework can be established to help the State Department
and courts in the determination process. To reduce unnecessary delays, the Judiciary
could be required to notify the proper authority within the State Department as soon
as a case is filed against a foreign head of state.183 Additionally, the Executive can
request that the courts institute a legal presumption in favor of immunity and require
that plaintiffs rebut the presumption before allowing the case to move forward.184
The presumption in favor of immunity would reduce the number of cases requiring
responses from the State Department.185 The framework could also include required
filings by the parties to facilitate the State Department’s fact-finding process.
179
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Alternatively, some have suggested that the State Department issue “guidelines”
to the courts in order to develop the common law approach.186 A “guidelines-based”
approach, however, is insufficient to address the current problems associated with
the common law procedure. General guidelines will not address these fact-specific
and sensitive cases with enough care to prevent foreign policy ramifications. Even
with State Department guidelines, each court charged with making immunity determinations will inevitability treat head of state cases differently, considering varying
factors and weighing those factors according to differing standards. The result will
be a continuation of the unpredictable and inconsistent common law approach.
Another alternative is a court-created analytical framework.187 The common law
approach, however, has proved that courts are ill-equipped to make immunity determinations. When making determinations, courts attempt to discern prior State Department
suggestions of immunity in head of state cases because the courts recognize that the
Executive is best suited for making political decisions.188 A framework created by the
Executive will eliminate the need for a framework created by the courts and, in turn,
will avoid the continuation of the issues of the common law approach.
No matter what the exact process the executive branch implements for addressing
civil tort claims against foreign heads of state, the most important goal is that the process be adopted before Congress takes action to preclude Executive input. An assertive Executive stance regarding these determinations will be important in keeping
Congress from taking its own action in the process, and also for preventing courts
from applying the common law approach going forward.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution grants both the executive and legislative branches of government
different duties regarding the foreign policy power, but the Executive is generally
charged with conducting foreign affairs on behalf of the United States.189 Foreign
sovereign immunity is a customary international law doctrine that had been left in
the hands of the Executive until the 1970s when Congress enacted the FSIA and the
Executive consented to the relinquishment of control over immunity determinations
for states’ commercial acts.190 Although the immunity of foreign states is now settled
in the United States, control over immunity determinations for foreign heads of state
is in flux after the Supreme Court’s decision in Samantar v. Yousuf.191 Samantar left
186
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the doctrine as applied to officials unclear, both in terms of how the determinations
are to be made and by whom.192
Samantar commenced a race between Congress and the Executive to take action
to secure power over immunity determinations going forward. Congress has the power
to amend the FSIA or pass a different statute to control immunity determinations for
suits against officials. While the foreign policy power is one that is widely accepted as
belonging to the Executive,193 the Supreme Court has expressed no will to overturn legislation that transfers the immunity determination from the Executive to the courts.194
Absent a constitutional challenge,195 the Executive may lose this power as a result of
such legislation if it does not act to preserve it and prevent potentially permanent
foreign policy ramifications. If, on the other hand, the Executive asserts control over
the immunity determinations and prevents congressional legislation, the President
could safely keep this important power within his control. Without action by either
branch, the courts will continue to apply the problematic common law approach.
This Note has argued that the Executive should not continue to follow the common law approach for foreign official immunity determinations because of the various
problems with the approach as it stands today. Further, it has been argued that the
Executive should take action to avoid the negative foreign policy implications that
would result if a mechanical, statutory approach were to be enacted by Congress.196
This Note has also presented the best means for Executive action: increased resources
for the State Department to assist it in making more informative, clear, and efficient
statements of interest going forward, as well as the creation of a framework that will
provide direction to courts in adjudicating cases against foreign heads of state, and
establish Executive control over the determinations.197 In short, the Executive must
act to retain power over complicated immunity determinations that are best left to
the executive branch. Further, the common law approach must be updated and
clarified to cure the inefficiencies, inconsistencies, and injustices that occur today.
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